I value **Morality.** Individuals can only create values if they are recognized in their moral place in society because society provides the values are capable of acting upon. **Reshef** [[1]](#footnote-1)**:**

Now, it is still left for me to show that **we cannot make strong evaluations,** i.e., **to morally classify our desires, outside the framework of the community** (claim 3), because one could claim that even if there are strong evaluations that constitute my identity, from this alone it does not follow that I cannot make strong evaluations on my own. Why should we affirm that judging my desires is done according to some external standards? Alternatively, it can be suggested that it is not my values which constitute my choice, but it is my choice which constitutes my values. In other words, I do not travel in a given moral space, using a compass showing me the way. Instead, I move in a vacuum, and wherever I turn would be where the needle points. But **making a choice involves judging the alternatives** in front of me, **and** in order for this judgment to be meaningful **it must be made in view of a standard that is independent of the action of judgment itself**. In other words, **if the standard changes according to the judgment so that the judgment will always be correct, the act of judging has no meaning**.11 Previously, I mentioned the agent's moral orientation. **The orientation is composed of two elements: space and the agent's location in it. Space is the external criterion, that must be set independently of the agent in order for the question 'Where do I stand?' to have meaning.** This is one aspect in which **the community constitutes her moral orientation. The community supplies the agent with the moral space in which she is located**, the external criterion in light of which she makes her moral judgments.

When an individual commits a crime against another, he or she creates an asymmetrical relationship between him or herself and the victim, thereby devaluing the victim’s place in society. **Farnham[[2]](#footnote-2)**:

**Wrongful action has communicative** and consequential **effects,** but it also **[that]** **creates a situation where one person is inferior to another in the way** he or **she is treated**. **A proper response to such action is** not just to deny what it asserts or to avert future bad consequences, butalso **to rectify this imbalance**. This is the Hegelian interpretation of wrongful action—**it invokes Hegel’s idea of the need to give our abstract ideas** (such as autonomy or right) **concrete expression through the use of social conventions that mediate our lives together**. 24 We need to do this because we are not primarily debaters about what is true, **we are primarily embodied agents living in a world together,** our activities coordinated by conventions. **Our ultimate purpose is** not to know what the world is like, butto do and create and **to know ourselves as doers and creators**. Hampton’s ideas of realization of value and acknowledgement of value are best understood on the Hegelian model of an ideal to be realized concretely and publicly in the world of human action. It is never true that the victim has less value than others, but **in cases of wrongful action the victim’s value is not realized or acknowledged. The fact that we are embodied, and live in a world where** external forces and **other embodied agents can physically inﬂuence what we do**, **means that the realization of our value in this world is not solely up to us**. That we live with others and care about how they regard us means that the acknowledgement of our value is not up to us. **Damage to the realization and acknowledgement of a** 610 **person’s value are** what Hampton calls **diminishment.** 25 To see better what she meant by this, we need to look more closely at the notions of realization and acknowledgement.

Thus, the standard is **maintaining social recognition,** defined as ensuring as the recognition of the value of the victim.

I contend that retribution rectifies the balance of social recognition.

A proportional response from an impartial moral authority is necessary to restore the victim’s position as a valued contributing member of society. **Farnham 2**:

Where no public action is taken against a wrongdoer, it doubles the threat his action projects: First, **the wrongdoer conveys and realizes his disregard for his victim’s will, then the public does** so also **through knowing inaction**. **A lack of retributive action** both **conveys** and realizes **indifference in a case where acknowledgment requires an active response.** **Public retribution**, on the other hand**, can correct mastery relation**. In criminal wrongdoing, **the parties involved are known and can be addressed directly**. A response to the act of wrongdoing can and should address these people as individuals and the speciﬁc ways in which the wrong has been effected. **Publicly excoriating the wrongdoer and exalting the victim will not do this.** It would be like saying, “Well, you’ve mastered that person, and that person has been mastered by you, and **we just want to say that we think it’s bad and your victim deserves better**.” **That’s taking the unengaged perspective of a spectator who has no direct responsibilities to the people concerned**. **In contrast, a proper vindication of the victim will work “not merely to ‘state’ the victim’s value, but also to realize it in the social milieu.”** 45 In the same way that wrongful action is not just an expression of the victim’s lesser value, but also a realization of it as lower relative to the wrongdoer who effects this realization, **punishment should be a realization by a moral authority of the victim’s value as equal to the wrongdoer, correcting the relation of inequality** that has been established.

1. Yonathan Reshef. Solidarity, Communitarian Ontology, and Individual Rights. <http://gradcon.huji.ac.il/2009/reshef.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Farnham, Daniel. A Hegelian Theory of Retribution, Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 39, No. 4, Winter 2008, pp 606-624. MO. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)